A direct contemporary Hegel-and-AI monograph on recognition, capitalism, social mediation, and AI as simulated interlocutor. Because it is short and independently published rather than a canonical university-press study, it should be used cautiously; nevertheless, it is one of the few book-length works whose title explicitly joins Hegel, capital, and artificial intelligence.

Weatherby argues that generative AI is cultural rather than cognitive, drawing on structuralist linguistic theory and the German Idealist heritage of cybernetics. The book continues his project of recovering the suppressed Hegelian genealogy of computing, tracing how Hegel entered AI theory through Gotthard Günther and the Biological Computer Laboratory.

Hui's first edited volume reconstructs the epistemology of cybernetics across philosophical traditions. Several chapters read AI not as a self-standing technology but as a stage in a longer history of organism, mechanism, and self-grounding system — a move that makes Hegel a structural reference even when he is not the explicit topic.

Hui extends his organology project into a theory of "megamachines" and planetary thinking, treating political form (polis, empire, state) as itself a technological phenomenon. Hegel's political state and Schmitt's Großraum are unpacked as forms of "political epistemology" that the rise of planetary-scale AI infrastructure now contests, opening the space for technodiversity as a regulative idea.

Žižek's most recent book places AI inside his Hegelian-Lacanian "dialectical materialism". Chapter 5 argues that the proper question is not whether LLMs are "smart enough" but whether they can attain the constitutive stupidity, finitude, and self-relating negativity of Hegelian spirit. It is the most visible recent example of a high-profile Hegelian author treating chatbots and post-humanism as a single theological-philosophical symptom.

Pasquinelli reconstructs AI not as the imitation of biological intelligence but as the historical outcome of labor automation and the mechanization of collective knowledge, running from Babbage through cybernetics to deep learning. "The inner code of AI" is treated as encoded social relations rather than as cognitive science, making this the single most useful recent companion to a Hegelian-Marxist treatment of machine intelligence.

Steinhoff offers a sustained Marxist analysis of the contemporary AI industry, treating AI primarily as an automation technology designed to capture the skills and knowledge of labor. The Hegelian categories of objectification, alienation, and the "general intellect" are operative throughout, making it the most rigorous monograph for grounding a Hegel-and-AI argument in actual political economy rather than only textual analogy.

Žižek asks what Hegel would have said about a "wired brain" — a direct neural-digital coupling that makes mental processes externally readable. The book treats posthumanism as a problem internal to Hegelian dialectics, engaging the digital police state, the technological singularity, the impotence of AI before the symbolic dimension of language, and the status of freedom under externalized cognition.

Winner of the 2021 Journal of the History of Philosophy Book Prize, this monograph establishes that life — not reason alone — is the central category of Hegel's logic. It is the load-bearing philosophical background for the argument (Suther, Thamrin) that genuine AI would require artificial life, not just artificial cognition.

Brandom's three-decade reading of the Phenomenology recasts Hegel as an inferentialist of conceptual content, grounded in mutual recognition and the social practice of giving and asking for reasons. It is the load-bearing background for Negarestani, Gangle, Malík/Hubálek, and the LLM-as-discursive-agent debates, because it converts Hegelian Geist into a normative-pragmatic, multi-agent infrastructure of inference.

Malabou traces three regimes of "intelligence" — empirical-genetic IQ, epigenetic plasticity, and the artificial-brain paradigm — and argues that the boundary between natural and artificial intelligence is dissolving from the inside. Plasticity is her partly Hegelian rewriting of mind as a material and historical formation/de-formation rather than a substance.

Hui reconstructs a philosophical trajectory from Kant's organic logic through Schelling and Hegel to Wiener, Gödel, and twentieth-century cybernetics, and from there into algorithmic AI. Recursivity is read as a break from Cartesian mechanism, and contingency as the structural condition under which a recursive system develops at all — the strongest contemporary bridge between German Idealism's logic of self-grounding and the architecture of machine learning.

A three-author Marxist analysis of AI as a force of capital, treating machine learning as the latest stage of the "general intellect" and arguing that AI capitalism threatens both labour and the form of the human itself. The Hegelian dimension runs through Marx: alienation, objectification, and the dialectic of master and servant are reactivated for AI-mediated production.

Negarestani synthesises Kantian transcendental psychology, Hegelian Geist, and Sellars-Brandom pragmatism into a systematic philosophy of intelligence designed to be commensurable with the project of AGI. Intelligence is reconstructed not as a private mental substance but as a socially, linguistically, and functionally articulated multi-agent activity that has to be historically realised — the most ambitious book-length philosophical bridge between German Idealism and AGI in English.

Johnston defends a "transcendental materialism" that develops the Hegelian legacy against and through Žižek's reading, with extended attention to recognition, negativity, and the dialectic of nature and spirit. Not on AI directly, it is the most important contemporary defence of the robustly Hegelian dialectical materialism that is the philosophical backbone of much of the recent Hegel-and-AI literature.

Winfield rethinks Hegel's entire account of subjective spirit — psyche, consciousness, and intelligence — and argues systematically that mental activity is not reducible to computation and that machines can never feel, be conscious, or think. The book is the extended companion to his shorter anti-AI argument in the Hegel Bulletin (2009), and the most rigorous Hegel-scholarship basis for the position that AI cannot achieve genuine mind.